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1962/11/07

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This document contains information of a confidential nature

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

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November 7, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To : G - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

ROOM 62

From : G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

DEPUTY UNDER

SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Requirements for Pressure on USSR and Cuba

The Soviets evidently are attempting to remove their
 *PREMs from Cuba as rapidly as possible, with limited verifi-
 cation at sea of their removal, in the expectation that the
 United States will then be less likely and less able to
 make effective its demands for verification on the ground in
 Cuba. They also probably expect that as time goes on they
 will be able to exact from the US more extensive commitments
 against not only invasion but other direct and indirect means
 of intervention in Cuba.

We do not know the extent to which the Soviets would
 like to get Cuban acquiescence in verification arrangements,
 or the extent to which they may be artfully using Cuban non-
 agreement as an excuse. It is likely that the Soviets have
 found Castro unwilling to proceed with some arrangements to
 which they do not particularly object themselves. At the same
 time, they are doubtless quite ready to use the lever of the
 requirement for Cuban consent to try and pry various assurances
 from the US, and to get the US to drop some of its demands. In
 any case, however, we believe that the US should in the first
 instance place clearly on the Soviets the burden of securing
 whatever Cuban compliance may be required to meet our demands.
 It is important that we never forget, nor let the Soviets
 doubt our clarity about, the extent to which Cuba presently
 is reliant upon Soviet support. If the Soviets apply maximum
 leverage against the Cubans this is to our advantage. If it
 succeeds in gaining Cuban acquiescence so much the better.
 If it fails we are then in a position to make clear to the
 Soviets that any inability on their part to secure such Cuban
 acquiescence will require us to impose unilateral pressures
 on Cuba in order to compel Cuban acceptance of our mutual
 objective.

Date. 4/3/92

The United

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MR Cases Only:

EO Citations

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 FOIA Exemptions
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[REDACTED] OADR
[REDACTED]



The United States should make clear that we expect the Soviets and/or Cubans to provide and permit: (a) removal of the missiles and bombers; (b) adequate verification of the removal of these weapons and assurance that none remain--which requires inspection on the ground in Cuba; and (c) adequate long-term arrangements providing assurance against the reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba. If any of these basic elements of our agreement are not fulfilled, the US considers that there has been no contract, and we retain complete freedom of action. If they are satisfactorily fulfilled, the United States will of course honor its commitment.

25 [REDACTED] The initial major move which the US could undertake to apply pressure on Castro would be an intensification of the quarantine. Institution of a full scale blockade (excluding only food and medicines) would quickly cast the long shadow of a severe future economic pinch. It would probably be desirable to indicate soon to the Soviets that we would institute such a measure, pointing out that while this might cause certain new problems, it would be necessary unless they are able to secure Cuban compliance. This should be conveyed in a manner which suggests that the Soviets have no doubt exercised their suasion on the Cubans but unsuccessfully. In this event, surely there can be little objection to our "helping" to apply pressure to accomplish our mutual objective, i.e., fulfillment of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. This would also put the Soviets on the defensive insofar as running Soviet ships through the blockade. A blockade, of course, would be only one of the means to which we might be compelled to resort. [REDACTED]

The most immediate problem has been to secure Soviet agreement to the removal of the offensive weapons. The question of adequate verification that such removal has been completed is, however, completely interrelated. The longer that the United States permits these questions to remain unresolved, the more difficult it will be to take such direct action as may be required to achieve the objectives set forth by the President on October 22 and the more likely are we to be faced by divisions with our allies, by domestic US political pressures which will move the issue out of the national security arena where it belongs and by the probability that the Soviets will gain a

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OADR

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impressive view of US ability to follow through on a course once launched. The temptation for them to revert to an on again-off again tactic in other areas, e.g., Berlin, thus may be increased.

cc: U - Mr. Ball
S/P - Mr. Rostow
ARA - Mr. Martin
INR - Mr. Hilsman
IO - Mr. Cleveland

G/PM:RLGarthoff/SWeiss/JCKitchen:rp


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EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

Record Number 103831

<u>SET</u>	Cuban Missile Crisis II
<u>DATE</u>	11/07/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>TITLE</u>	Requirements for Pressure on USSR and Cuba
<u>CTIT</u>	[Attached Cover Memo]
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>CLASS.</u>	Secret
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State. Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	Nitze, Paul H.
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Kitchen, Jeffrey C.
<u>NAMES</u>	Castro Ruz, Fidel
<u>NAMES</u>	Kennedy, John F.
<u>NAMES</u>	Khrushchev, Nikita S.
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>TERMS</u>	Blockades
<u>TERMS</u>	Bomber aircraft
<u>TERMS</u>	Medium-range ballistic missiles
<u>TERMS</u>	Missiles
<u>TERMS</u>	Offensive weapons
<u>TERMS</u>	Verification
<u>VARTY</u>	Excised Copy
<u>LENGTH</u>	4
<u>LOCOR</u>	
<u>CLLNO</u>	
<u>IPHRS</u>	
<u>MEMO</u>	

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

EX-101

November 8, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

To: The Honorable
Paul H. Nitze
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

The attached, transmitted informally,
may be of interest.

REVIEWED BY R DATE 1-16-91
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Jeffrey C. Kitchen

Attachment:
Memorandum dtd 11/7/62
from JCK to UAJ

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

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OASD(PA) DFOISR	4
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No. <u>1</u>	
Case No. <u>89-F-01-0248</u>	
T.S. No. <u>90-TS-202</u>	
Document No. <u>8</u>	

This document contains information of a SECRET nature
Number 12-14-1962, 1962-1963

G/PM

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October 7, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~ OADR

To : G - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
From : G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen
Subject: Requirements for Pressure on USSR and Cuba

The Soviets evidently are attempting to remove their MRNMs from Cuba as rapidly as possible, with limited verification at sea of their removal, in the expectation that the United States will then be less likely and less able to make effective its demands for verification on the ground in Cuba. They also probably expect that as time goes on they will be able to exact from the US more extensive commitments against not only invasion but other direct and indirect means of intervention in Cuba.

We do not know the extent to which the Soviets would like to get Cuban acquiescence in verification arrangements, or the extent to which they may be artfully using Cuban non-agreement as an excuse. It is likely that the Soviets have found Castro unwilling to proceed with some arrangements to which they do not particularly object themselves. At the same time, they are doubtless quite ready to use the lever of the requirement for Cuban consent to try and pry various assurances from the US, and to get the US to drop some of its demands. In any case, however, we believe that the US should in the first instance place clearly on the Soviets the burden of securing whatever Cuban compliance may be required to meet our demands. It is important that we never forget, nor let the Soviets doubt our alertness about, the extent to which Cuba presently is reliant upon Soviet support. If the Soviets apply maximum leverage against the Cubans this is to our advantage. If it succeeds in gaining Cuban acquiescence so much the better. If it fails we are then in a position to make clear to the Soviets that any inability on their part to secure such Cuban acquiescence will require us to impose unilateral pressures on Cuba in order to compel Cuban acceptance of our mutual objective.

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cc: U - Mr. Ball
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ARA - Mr. Martin
INR - Mr. Hilsen
IG - Mr. Cleveland

G/PM: ELGarthoff/SWeiss/JCKitchen:rp

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